The Shia house is a fake invention

During his first visit to Tehran as head of the new Iraqi government, Mohammed Shiaa al-Sudani, asked the Iranian supreme leader for protection, not from the Americans, but ‘”from our own people.” According to Sudani, they pose a greater threat to the sect’s rule in Iraq than the Americans do.
During private meetings with leaders of the Coordination Framework, Sudani admitted that he and the other leaders of the framework are not the guarantors of continued Shia rule in Iraq. Instead, he says, “The Americans are our last hope to stay in power. Once we lose them, we lose everything.” At first glance, this may appear to be a pragmatic political philosophy intended to ensure the survival of the so-called ‘Shia House.’
However, before delving deeper into the chronicle of sectarian rule in Iraq, it is important to examine the nature of this so-called ‘Shia House’ and whether it genuinely rests on firm political foundations. In reality, it has been the de facto ruling force since 2003, regardless of whether the government’s authority is real´-or-merely symbolic and-limit-ed to the Green Zone. There are, in truth, parallel powers, clerical and militia-based, that can challenge the government at any moment, not to mention the overpowering influence of Iran.
If the ‘Shia House’ was indeed fabricated by the infamous Ahmad Chalabi to unite sectarian and political blocs in order to control Iraq after the occupation, then we should look further back. Prior to the US invasion, Mowaffak al-Rubaie, then a member of the now-defunct Governing Council, and later National Security Adviser, assembled a group of suited sectarian figures to create the illusion of respectable community leadership. They issued what became known in London as the ‘Declaration of the Shias of Iraq.’ While these individuals have the right to express themselves, they not only smeared themselves in the mud of sectarianism, but also laid the groundwork for the identity-based killings carried out by Shia militias after the occupation, which were justified by the so-called historic right of the sect to rule Iraq.
Despite having lived freely in the West for years, they deliberately ignored the fact that nation-building is not rooted in hollow narratives of victimhood, but in genuine commitment to patriotism.
I am not sure how many of those listed in the ‘Declaration of the Shias of Iraq,’ published in Arab newspapers in London just months before the invasion, now regret their role in preparing the ground for sectarian bloodshed. However, with growing international pressure and signs that Iran’s sectarian project has failed in Syria and Lebanon, Iraq must also end the dominance of sectarianism and militias. Along with the majority of Iraqis, we are revisiting the term ‘Shia House’ only to discover, after more than twenty years, that it was a fake invention all along.
The ‘house’, originally cobbled together by Chalabi, quickly fractured into squabbling, hate-filled factions vying for shares in the government. It soon disintegrated into separate houses, which were then -convert-ed into grand palaces built with government funds and now owned by state looters enriching themselves. The residents of these political palaces care little for the original concept, if there ever was one. The original ‘Shia Declaration,’ comprising more than four thousand words, has become nothing more than sectarian nonsense, gathering dust on the desks of today’s Shia leaders, whether inside´-or-outside the Coordination Framework.
Now, as American messages arrive, talk of the ‘Shia House’ has resurfaced. The anxiety is so intense that the prominent sectarian figure Ammar al-Hakim has warned of the loss of the sect’s grip on Iraq. Meanwhile, Sudani’s feeble justifications about democracy and peaceful power transfer ring hollow-;- he is unable to defend his core message to the Iraqi people.
The leaders of the ‘Shia House’ believed that their invention could not survive unless a corresponding ‘Sunni House’ was created to maintain a false sense of political balance. But that idea was just as flimsy. The ‘Sunni House’ soon became a similarly empty conflict, no less chaotic than that within the ‘Shia House.’
Today, Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi’s warning may come to pass. Years ago, he quoted a Shia prime minister as saying that they had driven Iraqis to the point where they were just waiting for the opportunity to storm their homes and drag them through the streets of the Green Zone, a repetition of the historical cycle of violence often referenced by sociologist Ali al-Wardi when analysing Iraqi society.
The ‘Shia House’ is a fake invention, just like the ‘Sunni House,’ conjured up during a deviant historical moment after the occupation of Iraq. Its intention was to endure for years by breaking the concept of national identity, allowing sectarian thieves to hijack the state.
This fake concept cannot remain a fixture in political discourse, not only because it is fake, but also because Iraqis can no longer accept the rule of sectarianism over a national identity. While the current US messages may aim to end militia-led sectarian dominance in Iraq, this is not because America seeks to atone for its historical sin of occupying the country. Rather, it is because history cannot continue to legitimise the ongoing marketing of fake political inventions such as the ‘Shia House’ and its counterpart, the ‘Sunni House.’

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